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GENE PATENTS IN AUSTRALIA: A GAME THEORY 
APPROACH 
Kate M. Mead† 
Abstract: Gene patent validity is one of the most controversial issues in patent 
law.  In Australia, the question of whether to eliminate human gene patents has reached 
both Parliament and the federal courts.  Opponents of gene patents argue that gene 
patents increase the cost of healthcare and impede progress in genetic research. 
Proponents respond that gene patents are essential incentives for the biotech industry, and 
that Australia has an obligation to recognize them under the WTO-administered Treaty 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”).  Because patents 
require inventors to publically disclose their discoveries, Australia’s rejection of the gene 
patent system would allow Australian companies to benefit from these disclosures 
without compensating the patent holder–implicating industries and legal regimes far 
beyond its borders.  Australia has the power to decide whether gene patents are valuable 
to its citizens.  This comment represents the controversy as a game between Australia and 
the rest of the developed world, where it “cooperates” if it continues to respect gene 
patent rights and it “defects” if it declares genes unpatentable.  From Australia’s 
perspective, the immediate economic benefits of eliminating gene patents may outweigh 
its costs.  However, the long-term costs of eliminating gene patents may be unacceptable 
to proponents of gene patents.  In addition, impending advances in genetic sequencing 
technology will render gene patents economically insignificant, regardless of whether 
gene patents are a beneficial policy decision. An international solution, which 
incentivizes cooperation or punishes defection, is necessary for rational state actors to 
recognize gene patents.  Ultimately, this paper proposes three potential solutions to this 
problem:  A) starting a new intellectual property regime for human genes, B) creating a 
specialized patent regime for human genes, and C) incentivizing individual governments 
to fund research through public, non-commercial sources. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Gene patents represent one of the most controversial issues in modern 
patent law.  The controversy concerns whether human genes should continue 
to be patent eligible.  Criticisms of gene patents fall into three broad 
categories:  legal,1 moral,2 and utilitarian.3   
                                                      
† Juris Doctor expected in 2014, University of Washington School of Law.  I would like to thank 
Professor Steve Calandrillo for his assistance with the project.  I would also like to thank my peers at the 
Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal, particularly Alec Paxton, Courtney Skiles, and Alyson Palmer for their 
thoughtful feedback.  Finally, thanks to Dominic Forte for his emotional support through the writing 
process.   
1  See, e.g., Dianne Nichol, On the Legality of Gene Patents, 29 MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 809 (2006) 
(using legal interpretation to critique gene patents, but also acknowledging the practical effects of gene 
patents).  But see David B. Resnik, Discoveries, Inventions, and Gene Patents in WHO OWNS LIFE? 135 
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The utilitarian arguments advanced by critics are particularly telling 
because they demonstrate that both proponents and opponents of gene 
patents have the same goal:  to increase access to and understanding of 
genetic diseases as quickly as possible.4 
Theoretically, patent systems increase the rate of technological 
innovation.5   Neither side of the gene patent debate argues that genetic 
research is not important or should not be promoted.  In fact, opponents of 
gene patents argue that patents inhibit the development of genetic research.6 
As evidenced by the development of the World Trade Organization’s 
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (“TRIPS”) agreement, patent 
policy must be considered on an international scale.  If TRIPS is ineffective, 
then countries can reap the majority of the potential benefits of gene patents 
without participating in its drawbacks and those countries are incentivized to 
eliminate gene patents entirely.  This comment argues that nations which 
directly subsidize genetic tests, such as Australia, are incentivized to 
eliminate gene patents. 
Additionally, given that the purpose of patents is to increase 
technological innovation, patent policy is inherently tied to advances in 
technology.  Here, however, proponents of gene patents have a problem.  
                                                                                                                                                              
(David Magnus, et. al., Prometheus Books 2002) [hereinafter WHO OWNS LIFE?] (arguing that the 
discovery versus invention distinction is “fundamentally misguided,” and that it should not be a meaningful 
distinction as applied to genetic “discoveries”). 
2  See, e.g., Barbara Looney, Should Genes be Patented?  The Gene Patenting Controversy: Legal, 
Ethical, and Policy Foundations of an International Agreement, 26 L. & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 231, 236 (1994) 
(describing moral objections to patenting human genes).  But see Mark J. Hanson, Patenting Genes and 
Life, Improper Commodification? in WHO OWNS LIFE? 161, 162 (arguing that that moral objections dealing 
with encroachment of “market thinking on subjective properties of persons and other living beings” is not a 
sufficient moral justification to ban gene patents).  Note that in Europe, according to Article 53(a) of the 
European Patent Convention, technology can be precluded from legal patentability if the technology 
violates “public order and morality,” creating an important overlap between moral and legal considerations 
in patent law.  See Ari Berkowitz & Daniel H. Kevles, Patenting Human Genes: The Advent of Ethics in 
the Political Economy of Patent Law, in WHO OWNS LIFE? 75. 
3  For a concise summary of utilitarian arguments against gene patents, see the Australian Law 
Reform Commission (“ALRC”) summary publication on gene patenting:  ALRC, GENES AND INGENUITY: 
GENE PATENTING AND HUMAN HEALTH, ALRC REPORT 99 § 12 [hereinafter ALRC REPORT 99], available 
at http://www.alrc.gov.au/publications/12-patents-and-human-genetic-research/impact-gene-patents-
research.  Paradoxically, utilitarian opponents of gene patents argue that patents discourage innovation and 
investment in genetic research.  See also Nuno Pires de Carvalho, The Problem of Gene Patents, 3 WASH. 
U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 701 (2004); infra Part III.B. 
4  See, e.g., Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The 
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698 (1998). 
5 See infra Part III.A; see also Juan C. Ginarte & Walter G. Park, Determinants of Patent Rights: A 
Cross-National Study, 28 RES. POL’Y 283, 283-301 (1997). 
6 See infra Part III.B. 
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Developments in cost-effective methods of whole-genome sequencing will 
soon enable companies to test for genes without infringing on any gene 
patents.7  This would allow companies and individuals to test for a patented 
gene without infringing on the patent, and in effect render a patent holder’s 
exclusive license unenforceable.  Ultimately, regardless of whether gene 
patents are formally eliminated, gene patent proponents will lose the battle 
by default.8 
This comment examines both the policy supporting the recognition of 
human gene patents, and the impact of developing technology on the 
enforcement of gene patents.  Part II establishes the background of human 
gene patents in Australia.  Part III introduces utilitarian arguments for and 
against gene patents, while concluding that there is a strong policy argument 
for gene patents as applied to Australia.  In Part IV, this comment establishes 
that, despite international agreements on intellectual property rights, 
countries like Australia are rationally motivated to eliminate gene patents.  
Part V introduces the effect of emerging whole-genome sequencing 
technology on currently recognized gene patents.  Finally, Part VI introduces 
potential solutions for gene patent proponents, in order to maintain the 
benefits of gene patents beyond the advent of personalized medicine. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Human gene patents are controversial, and the debate over gene 
patents is incredibly complex.  In order to explain the arguments 
surrounding gene patents in Australia, this section introduces the basic 
background of Australian patent law and genome science.  Section A 
introduces the history of the gene patent controversy in Australia.  Section B 
explains the background of patent law in Australia.  Section C describes the 
basic science of genetics and genomics, and introduces the scope of human 
gene patents as they currently exist. 
A. History of the Gene Patent Controversy in Australia 
Last May, a federal member of Parliament, Melissa Parke, urged the 
Australian Parliament to ban all human gene patents.9  On the Australian 
television program Lateline, she asserted that “genes . . . should be freely 
                                                      
7  See infra Part V. 
8  Id. 
9  Cth, Parliamentary Debates, Federation Chamber, 21 May 2012, 4977 (Melissa Parke, Member of 
the Australian Parliament for Fremantle) (Austl.)  
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available anywhere,” and should not be “locked up in the hands of private 
corporations.”10   
Parke’s position was not novel or unusual.  In 2002, the federal 
attorney general charged the Australian Law Reform Commission (“ALRC”) 
with “examin[ing] the laws and practices governing intellectual property 
rights over genetic materials and related technologies, with a particular focus 
on human health issues.”11  After soliciting opinions from the public, the 
ALRC released its report, which asserted that gene patents were 
problematic,12  but did not recommend explicitly excluding human genes 
from patent eligibility.13  It also invited the government to respond to its 
findings.14 
Before the government formulated a response, there was a flurry of 
analysis throughout the Australian government on the topic of gene patents.  
In 2010, the Senate released its own gene patents report, which 
recommended implementing a framework to reduce any adverse effects of 
gene patents on healthcare, medical research, and public health.15  Later that 
year, the Australian Council on Intellectual Property 16  also issued a 
statement declining to recommend eliminating gene patents.17  In response to 
the senate report, the government agreed to keep human genes patent 
eligible in 2011.18   
The controversy within Parliament did not stop there.  That same year, 
legislators in Parliament introduced the Patent Amendment (Human Genes 
and Biological Products) Bill 2010, which sought to amend the Patents Act 
1990 to expressly forbid isolated deoxyribonucleic acid (“DNA”) from being 
                                                      
10  A transcript is available at http://www.abc.net.au/lateline/content/2012/s3502733.htm.   
11  ALRC REPORT 99, supra note 3.  
12  See, e.g., id. § 12.80 (noting that gene patents would become a problem if patent holders strictly 
enforced their rights). 
13  Id. Recommendation 7-1. 
14  Id. 
15  Senate Community Affairs Committee Inquiry into Gene Patents, PARLIAMENT OF AUSTRALIA, 
available at http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate_Committees?url=clac_ 
ctte/completed_inquiries/2010-13/gene_patents_43/report/index.htm. 
16  The Australian Council on Intellectual Property is an independent council, appointed by the 
Australian government to advise it on novel legal issues.  For more information, please see its website at 
http://www.acip.gov.au/. 
17  ADVISORY COUNCIL ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER, FINAL REPORT 
(December 2010), available at http://www.acip.gov.au/library/ACIP%20PSM%20final%20report%204% 
20Feb%202011.pdf. 
18  AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO SENATE COMMUNITY AFFAIRS REFERENCES 
COMMITTEE GENE PATENTS REPORT (Nov. 2011) [hereinafter GENE PATENTS REPORT 2011], available at 
http://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/pdfs/Australian_Government_Response_to_Senate_Committee_Gene_ 
Patents_Report.pdf. 
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patent eligible.19  While the government finally released a new response to 
the senate report in 2011, recommending against eliminating gene patents,20 
the Patent Amendment (Human Genes and Biological Products) Bill is still 
actively being considered by Parliament.21 
 In addition to administrative and legislative action, the Australian 
judiciary became involved in the debate.  On February 15, 2013, a federal 
court in Australia released an opinion confirming the patent eligibility of 
human genes under current law.22  The case was filed to challenge Myriad 
Genetics’ BRCA1 gene,23 a gene discovered by Myriad which signals a high 
propensity for developing breast cancer in carriers.24  Despite this initial 
ruling by the district court, it has been appealed by the challenging party.25 
 Beyond Australian jurisdiction, the U.S. Supreme Court has also 
accepted a challenge to Myriad’s patents as a part of its 2013 term.26  Given 
that Australian courts often use U.S. court opinions as persuasive authority 
for determining patent cases,27 the U.S. case may affect future challenges to 
gene patents in the Australian federal court system. 
 While the gene patent debate has raged throughout the world for 
years, it is still an incredibly controversial issue.  Because of parliamentary 
and judicial challenges to gene patents, they are still an open issue in 
Australia.  Much of the legal debate regarding gene patents, however, has its 
                                                      
19  Patent Amendment (Human Genes and Biological Products) Bill 2010 (Cth.) (Austl.), available at 
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2011B00012. 
20  Dr Martin O'Brien, The Gene Patents Debate in Australia–An Update, SPRUSON & FERGUSON, 
available at http://www.spruson.com/au/epublications/newsalerts/GenePatentsDebate_Update.html (report 
is referenced in this source). 
21   See Patent Amendment (Human Genes and Biological Products) Bill 2010 (Cth.) (Austl.).   
22  Cancer Voices Australia v Myriad Genetics Inc. [2013] FCA 65 (Austl.). 
23  Id. at 2. 
24  Id.  The BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes are some of the most successful discoveries in genetic 
research.  An estimated ten percent of all cases of breast cancer are traceable to mutated BRCA1 and 
BRCA2 genes.  Genetics, BREASTCANCER.ORG (Sept. 17, 2012), available at 
http://www.breastcancer.org/risk/factors/genetics.  Women who have both mutated genes have up to an 
eighty percent chance of developing breast cancer in their lifetimes.  Id.  Thus, the discovery of which 
variations of the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes are associated with breast cancer was a major breakthrough in 
cancer prevention.  Patients who test positive for the mutations early in their lives are able to plan their 
healthcare management plans accordingly.  See Mark D. Schwartz, Impact of BRCA1/BRCA2 Counseling 
and Testing on Newly Diagnosed Breast Cancer Patients, 22 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 1823 (2004). 
25  Joe Schneider, Myriad Genetics Win on Gene Patent Ownership is Appealed, BLOOMBERG, Mar. 3, 
2013, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-03-04/myriad-genetics-win-on-gene-patent-
ownership-is-appealed.html. 
26  Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 
2012), cert. granted, 133 S.Ct. 694 (U.S. Nov. 30, 2012) (No. 12-398). 
27  Aktiebolaget Hässle v. Alphapharm (2002) 212 CLR 411 (“The reasoning in . . . United States 
authorities should be accepted in preference to the path apparently taken in the English decisions”). 
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basis in the patent law regime in Australia.  The following section 
summarizes general patent law in Australia. 
B. Patent Law in Australia 
 Australia’s patent obligations are set forth in both its domestic patent 
laws and international agreements.  The origins of Australian patent law are 
traceable to English patent law.28  In 1623, the English Parliament enacted 
the Statute of Monopolies, which authorized the Crown to issue a “letters 
patent” for “any manner of new manufactures within [the] realm” to “the 
true and first inventors of such manufacture.”29  Although the English Crown 
awarded monopolies to individuals prior to the Statute of Monopolies, the 
recipients of those monopolies did not have to be the inventors, nor did those 
inventions have to be new and useful.30  The Statute of Monopolies changed 
the award of exclusive rights for inventions from merely awards of royal 
favor into awards for advancements in art and technology.31 
As an English colony, and a member of the “realm,”32 early Australian 
inventors applied for patents in England.33  After the Australian colonies 
established independent legislatures, an inventor could also directly petition 
a given legislature to pass a private bill that effectively awarded a patent.34  
The first formal Australian patent system was established in 1852, when the 
New South Wales legislature passed its first patent act.35  On June 1, 1904, 
the different patent systems of each colony were consolidated into a single 
Australian commonwealth agency to oversee all patents in Australia.  This 
agency is known as IP Australia, and still administers the patent system 
today.36   
                                                      
28  It should be noted that the English system was not the first patent system in the world.  The basic 
elements of patent law can be traced to a fifteenth century Venetian statute, which provided a ten-year 
monopoly to inventions that were novel and useful.  See MARTIN J. ADELMAN, RANDALL R. RADER, & 
JOHN R. THOMAS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 8 (3d ed.). 
29  Statute of Monopolies, 1623, 21 Jac 1, c. 3, § 6 (Eng.). 
30  See Chris R. Kyle, “But a New Button to an Old Coat”: The Enactment of the Statute of 
Monopolies, 19 J. LEGAL HIST. 203 (1998). 
31  Id. 
32  Statute of Monopolies, supra note29. 
 33  Patents: History, STATE LIBRARY OF VICTORIA (Dec. 12, 2012), available at 
http://guides.slv.vic.gov.au/patents. 
34  See e.g., South Australian Private Act No. 1 of 1848 (Cth.) (Austl.) (recording a patent application 
for an “improved windlass”). 
35  See Barton Hack, A History of the Patent Profession in Colonial Australia (1984) (presented at the 
Annual Conference of the Institute of Patent Attorneys of Australia).  
36  Our History, IP AUSTRALIA (2012), http://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/about-us/what-we-do/our-
history/ (Last visited May 1, 2013). 
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The last major overhaul to patent eligibility in Australia occurred with 
the Patents Act of 1990.  In this act, any “article of manufacture” is patent 
eligible if it is novel, useful, and was not used secretly before the application 
date. 37   The Patents Act, unlike U.S. patent statutes, also specifically 
excludes human beings, 38  plants, and animals 39  from patent eligibility. 40  
Given the vague language of the Patents Act, IP Australia guidelines are 
important for determining (on a practical level) which patent applications are 
likely to be granted. 
Internationally, Australia is similarly situated to other developed 
countries such as the U.S.  Australia entered into the Paris Convention in 
1925, and is still a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(“WIPO”). 41  In 1995, Australia become a member of the World Trade 
Organization (“WTO”), and is thus a signatory to the Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights agreement (“TRIPS”).42 
Although Australia has an independent patent system, with an 
independent body of common law, Australian courts have borrowed from 
other jurisdictions.  Notably, the High Court of Australia has acknowledged 
that it finds U.S. jurisprudence to be particularly helpful when resolving 
patent issues.43  Because of the similarity of the systems, and the breadth of 
patent cases in the U.S., Australian courts look towards U.S. patent cases in 
emerging technological areas such as biotechnology.44   
With respect to human genes, IP Australia officially states that “a 
DNA or gene sequence that has been isolated may be patentable.” 45  
According to the agency, a given isolated DNA structure is patentable so 
                                                      
37  Patents Act 1990 (Cth) ch. 1, s 18.1 (Austl.) 
38  Id. § 18.2. 
39  Id. § 18.3.  One major difference between biotechnology patents in Australia and the U.S. is the 
validity of plant patents.  Section 18 of Australia’s Patents Act 1990 explicitly states that plants are not 
patent eligible.  In contrast, the U.S. Congress specifically created a separate patent regime for plants.  See 
35 U.S.C. 161 (2006).   
40  While the United States Code does not specifically state that human beings are not patent eligible, 
the other barriers of patent eligibility in 35 U.S.C. 101 (2006) and various common law rules effectively 
result in the same outcome as the Australian statute.  See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 
(1980). 
41  Treaty Database, Paris Convention, Australia, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/remarks.jsp?cnty_id=184C (last visited May 12, 2013). 
 42  Australia and the WTO, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/english/ 
thewto_e/countries_e/australia_e.htm.  
43  Aktiebolaget Hässle v. Alphapharm (2002) 212 CLR 411.  
44  Brief for Cancer Council Australia et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 5, Ass’n for 
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics (No. 12-298). 
45  Patents for Biological Inventions, IP AUSTRALIA, Dec. 6, 2012, http://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/get-
the-right-ip/patents/about-patents/what-can-be-patented/patents-for-biological-inventions/ (last visited May 
1, 2013). 
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long as it follows the other statutory rules of patentability.46  Thus, isolated 
DNA patents are currently issued and valid in Australia.  Despite this 
seemingly expansive definition, so-called “gene” patents are actually quite 
narrow.  The following section describes the legal scope of gene patents, and 
compares it to the scientific scope of genes and genetic testing. 
C. Genes and Genetic Testing 
Patent law is concerned with defining technology at the forefront of 
science and engineering.  Thus, it is necessary to discuss the relationship 
between the scientific definition of genes, and its relationship to the legal 
definition of genes in gene patents.  Those definitions are not equivalent.  
From a scientific perspective, genes represent the information 
contained in each individual that provide for the blueprints of physical 
traits.47  Each human has a total of 46 chromosomes, which are particles 
made up of strands of DNA and packed with protein. 48   Twenty-three 
chromosomes are inherited from each parent–forming the basis of 
inheritability.49  
While DNA encodes plans for an organism, it must be translated into 
usable proteins to be expressed in that organism.50  DNA is “transcripted” 
into complementary strands of ribonucleic acid (“RNA”), which is then 
“translated” into amino acids.  Amino acids are the biological building 
blocks of polypeptides, which include proteins.51  Proteins are perhaps the 
most important molecules that comprise each human body–they can be 
hormones, 52  they can make up muscle, 53  they can be used to coagulate 
blood.54   Proteins are so important that DNA–which exists for the sole 
purpose of encoding protein–can determine an individual’s appearance or 
propensity for disease.55  In summary, DNA is used to create RNA, and RNA 
is used to create chains of amino acids, including proteins.  DNA essentially 
acts as a blueprint for the physical and chemical structures that define 
individual human beings. 
                                                      
46  Id. 
47 GENETICS 50 (Richard Robinson ed., 2003). 
48 Id. at 133. 
49 Id. at 132. 
50 Id. at 50. 
51 Id. at 198. 
52 Id. at 160. 
53 BIOLOGY 109 (Richard Robinson ed., 2005). 
54 Id. at 86. 
55 GENETICS, supra note 47, at 213. 
JUNE 2013  GENE PATENTS IN AUSTRALIA 759 
 
Despite the apparent simplicity of genetics, it is quite laborious to 
research in practice.  It may seem as though genetic research is as simple as 
comparing DNA sequences between individuals.  However, the process is 
complicated by the fact that not every DNA sequence contained in an 
individual’s chromosomes is actually used to create proteins.56  Some DNA 
sequences are never translated to RNA.57  Some RNA sequences are never 
transcripted into amino acids. 58   Sometimes, certain cellular conditions 
change what DNA is translated into RNA, or what RNA is transcripted into 
amino acids.59  Thus, genetic research is more than about determining the 
sequence of an individual’s DNA; it concerns determining DNA sequences 
that are actually “expressed.”60  Those usable sequences of DNA are known 
as genes.61 
Although they are known as “gene” patents, the term is a bit of a 
misnomer.  In scientific terms, a gene is a sequence and location of an 
encoding chain of DNA within the human genome.62  The subject matter of 
gene patents, in contrast, is merely isolated fragments of DNA.63  In order to 
have utility as a diagnostic tool, those fragments share a sequence with 
human genes as they appear in the genome.64  However, a gene patent does 
encompass a genetic sequence:  it only protects an isolated segment of DNA 
that shares a sequence with a human gene.65   The subject matter of an 
eligible gene patent is a distinct, artificial molecular entity.66  Thus, a gene 
patent is not literally a patent on a gene–it is a patent on “isolated DNA.” 
In the U.S.,67 Australia,68 and other nations, 69 isolated DNA molecules 
that match the sequence of human genes are patent eligible.  Australia and 
                                                      
56  Id. at 51 
57  Id. at 62. 
58  Id. 
59  Id. 
         60  Id. at 66 (describing how different cellular conditions during early development can change gene 
expression).  Gene expression refers to “the process through which information in a gene is used to produce 
the final gene product:  an RNA molecule or a protein.”  Id. at 61. 
61  Id. at 61 
62  Id. at 50. 
63  See, e.g., Association for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 
1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S.Ct. 694 (U.S. Nov. 30, 2012) (No. 12-398) (opinion 
below, holding that isolated DNA is patent eligible subject matter). 
64  Id. at 1332. 
65  Id. at 1331. 
66  Id. at 1332. 
67  The U.S. Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari on a challenge to the patent eligibility of 
Myriad’s human gene patents.  Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S.Ct 694 
(2012) (accepting certiorari).  
68  GENE PATENTS REPORT 2011, supra note 18.  
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the U.S. share similar patent eligibility requirements for isolated DNA 
molecules.70  Since an isolated DNA sequence does not occur naturally,71 the 
patentability of isolated DNA is assumed under the broader category of 
novel chemical structures. 72   Thus, when Myriad Genetics and its co-
inventors received patents for the BRCA1 and BRCA2 “genes,” those 
patents were exclusive licenses for fragmented, isolated DNA molecules.73  
It may seem that, because gene patents do not literally encompass 
human genes, they are not necessary to test for human genes as they appear 
in the cell.  However, isolated DNA molecules (and portions of those 
molecules) are essential for our most popular, low-cost genetic testing 
method:  polymerase chain reaction (“PCR”). 74  
PCR requires the use of small isolated DNA fragments that are 
complementary with a targeted gene. 75   These fragments are known as 
“primers.”76  The process begins when primers are added to a sample of a 
patient’s DNA.77  PCR occurs in three stages.  During the denaturation stage, 
the solution is heated, causing the bonds between the patient’s double-
stranded DNA to break, leaving complementary single-stranded DNA. 78  
During an annealing stage, the solution is cooled, allowing the single-
stranded DNA to reattach.79 This sample is made to contain significantly 
more “primers” than the single stranded DNA fragments.80  The primers are 
much more likely to attach to the patient’s single-stranded DNA, than the 
                                                                                                                                                              
69  Isabelle Huys et al., The Fate and Future of Patents on Human Genes and Genetic Diagnostic 
Methods, 13 NATURE REVIEWS GENETICS 441, 442 (2012).  
    70 ALRC REPORT 99, supra note 3, § 8. 
71  Chemical structures that do not occur naturally theoretically meet the novelty requirements set 
forth in Australian patent law (Patents Act 1990, Section 7), and U.S. patent law (35 U.S.C. § 102).  
Neither the Australian challenge, nor the U.S. challenge to Myriad’s gene patents included a challenge 
based on novelty.  See Cancer Voices Australia v Myriad Genetics Inc. [2013] FCA 65, 8 (Austl.); Ass’n 
for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012), cert. 
granted, 133 S.Ct. 694 (U.S. Nov. 30, 2012) (No. 12-398). 
72  Cancer Voices Australia v Myriad Genetics Inc. [2013] FCA 65, 8 (Austl.); Ass’n for Molecular 
Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S.Ct. 
694 (U.S. Nov. 30, 2012) (No. 12-398). 
73  Cancer Voices Australia v Myriad Genetics Inc. [2013] FCA 77 (Austl.).. 
74  The 1993 Nobel Prize in chemistry was awarded for the development of PCR. THE NOBEL PRIZE 
IN CHEMISTRY 1994, http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/chemistry/laureates/1993/ (last visited May 8, 
2013). 
75  Randall K. Saiki et al., Primer-Directed Enzymatic Amplification of DNA with a Thermostable 
DNA Polymerase, 239 SCI. 487, 487 (1988). 
76  Id. 
77  Id. 
78  Id. 
79  Id. 
80  Id. 
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single-stranded DNA to its original complement.81  During the “elongation” 
stage, the attached primers guide a heat-stable DNA polymerase enzyme to 
replicate the targeted gene.82  The denaturation, annealing, and elongation 
cycle is repeated many times, amplifying the replicated gene.83  If the PCR 
test is positive, the solution contains many copies of the DNA fragment, 
making it is relatively simple to test for the presence of that fragment.84   
If the patient’s DNA had the gene that the primer was designed to 
target, the process produces numerous copies of the genetic sequence.  A 
positive PCR test is designed to create lots of isolated DNA molecules with 
the same sequence as the targeted gene.  Thus, while a “gene” patent does 
not encompass the patient’s DNA, it does encompass the molecular structure 
created by the PCR process.  
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that a positive PCR test for a 
patented gene literally infringes on that patent, because it is designed to 
produce many copies of the matching isolated DNA molecule.  As such, 
gene patents practically preclude all other companies and individuals from 
testing for that gene in a cost-effective way.85  In both the U.S. and Australia, 
Myriad Genetics has the power to keep researchers, healthcare 
organizations, and other companies from using PCR to test for BRCA1 and 
BRCA2, thus excluding all of its currently viable commercial competitors.86   
It is important to note that scope of gene patents does not cover 
“genetic information per se,”87 nor does it cover “naturally occurring DNA 
and RNA as they exist in cell.”88   Each gene patent literally covers an 
artificial strand of DNA with the same sequence as a naturally occurring 
DNA sequence.  Myriad’s BRCA1 patent, for example, could not “be 
infringed by someone who merely reproduced a naturally occurring DNA 
sequence in written or digital form.”89 
 Australia and the U.S. issue patents for isolated DNA molecules.  
When a sequence matches a gene sequence, it is referred to as a “gene” 
patent, despite the fact that it is not actually a patent on a gene.  However, 
using PCR, those isolated DNA sequences are produced in the process of 
                                                      
81  Id. 
82  Id. 
83  Id. 
84  This is possible using gel electrophoresis and southern blot techniques.  Id. at 488. 
85  However, arguably, this will change. See infra Part V.  
86  See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 
2012), cert. granted, 133 S.Ct. 694 (U.S. Nov. 30, 2012) (No. 12-398). 
87  Cancer Voices Australia v Myriad Genetics Inc. [2013] FCA 65, 76 (Austl.). 
88  Id. at 77 
89  Id. at 87. 
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testing for the presence of a gene in a patient’s genome.  Although Myriad’s 
patents only encompass the isolated DNA molecule which has a matching 
sequence to the BRCA gene, it is currently effective in preventing 
unauthorized BRCA testing.  
 
III. GENE PATENTS BENEFIT SOCIETY 
 This section establishes the proposition that gene patents provide a 
substantial benefit to society by promoting genetic research.  Section A 
introduces the concept that patents promote innovation and technological 
advancement.  Section B introduces various criticisms of using patent law to 
promote genetic research.  Section C compares the genetic industry to the 
pharmaceutical industry, and concludes that patent protection is essential to 
the genetic industry as it is to the pharmaceutical industry.  Finally, Section 
D explains Australia’s Raising the Bar Act and its importance in ensuring 
that human gene patents do not deter innovation.  
A. Basic Patent Theory: Patents Increase the Rate of Innovation in 
a Given Technological Area, and Promote Technological 
Advancement 
Scientific research is supported by both commercial and non-
commercial sources.90  Commercial sources of research include for-profit 
companies such as Myriad Genetics.91   Non-commercial sources include 
non-profit charitable organizations,92 as well as publicly-funded laboratories 
(e.g., university laboratories).93  Logically, the total advance of this field is 
dependent on the combined contributions of both sources of research. 
Patent law encourages commercial sources of genetic research to 
publicly disclose their technological advances.94  In exchange for the right to 
                                                      
90  Richard R. Nelson, The Simple Economics of Basic Scientific Research, 67 J. OF POL. ECON. 297, 
302 (1959). 
91  A record of Myriad’s Security and Exchange Commission filings can be found on its website: 
http://www.myriad.com/. 
92  See, e.g., PHG FOUNDATION, http://www.phgfoundation.org/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2013) (supporting 
medical research as an independent charitable organization). 
93  The National Science Foundation’s grants regarding “genes and genome systems” fund non-
commercial research laboratories. See NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION, GENES AND GENOME SYSTEMS 
CLUSTER,  http://www.nsf.gov/funding/pgm_summ.jsp?pims_id=12780 (last visited May 8, 2013). 
94  See supra Part II.A (patent law in Australia); see also Frederic M. Scherer, The Economics of 
Human Gene Patents, 77 ACAD. MED. 1348, 1363 (“Not allowing [gene] patents in the future would 
discourage some research supported by private-sector investment.”). 
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exclude other parties from profiting from their invention for a limited time, 
an inventor discloses how to make and use that invention.95 
Without the right to exclude, commercial genetic researchers may be 
either discouraged from investing in genetic research, or protect their 
discoveries under trade secret law.96  If commercial firms do not invest in 
genetic research, it logically follows that less total research would be 
performed to discover gene-disease correlations.  If they do invest in genetic 
research, but decide to protect human gene inventions through trade secret, 
several problems would occur.  
A company that protects its gene discovery through trade secret law 
would still be able to exercise a monopoly over and charge a fee for the use 
of that gene, except, unlike patents, a company can protect its secret, 
potentially forever. 97   Proponents point out that as long as a company 
properly protects its trade secret, the public may never get a “generic” 
version of that genetic test, increasing costs to consumers.98 In addition, 
under a trade secret regime, the public may never learn about a given genetic 
discovery.99  At the very least, this may cause researchers to unnecessarily 
and inefficiently re-research gene/disease correlations—simply because they 
would have no way of knowing whether a given gene/disease correlation had 
already been discovered. 
In addition to resorting to trade secret law, there is an additional 
drawback of rejecting human gene patents.  Even assuming that genetic 
research is supported by both commercial and non-commercial sources, the 
results of commercial sources of genetic research provide more economic 
benefits than non-commercial sources.100  The more links between genes and 
                                                      
95  Patents Act 1990 (Cth.) s 40 (Austl.). 
96  Trade secret law is governed by tort in common law countries.  Essentially, so long as a piece of 
intellectual property is kept secret from the rest of the world, the keeper retains exclusive use without 
having to publicly disclose the intellectual property through the patent system.  For more information about 
trade secrets in Australia, see the IP Australia website at http://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/get-the-right-
ip/other-types-of-IP/confidentiality-trade-secrets/. 
97  Id. 
98  See Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of Justification, 86 
CAL. L. REV. 241, 265 (1998) (noting that trade secret law offers inventors the chance to set a value for 
their inventions, higher than the one prescribed by patent law). 
99  Id. at 266 (citing Steven N. S. Cheung, Property Rights in Trade Secrets, 20 ECON. INQUIRY 40, 
44 (1982)). 
100  See Research Funding as an Investment: Can we Measure the Returns?, U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE 
OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, April 1986, available at http://www.fas.org/ota/reports/8622.pdf (showing 
that money spent in the private sector provides more of an economic benefit than money spent in the public 
sector).  Although genetic research is a relatively new area of biotechnology, other more developed areas of 
technology have proven to be entirely dependent on private sector contributions.  See, e.g., C. Scott 
Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory Design Problem, 18 N.Y.U. 
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diseases discovered, the greater the scientific benefit101 derived from genetic 
research. 102   Theoretically, the rate of innovation is proportional to the 
amount of research funding invested in a given field.  Commercial sources 
invest vastly more funding into genetic research than non-commercial 
sources,103 thereby supporting the presumption that the commercial sector 
provides more development of genetic linkages than the public sector. 
In addition, commercial sources are better suited to offer technologies 
to end-users.104  While both commercial and non-commercial sources invest 
in researching technology, generally only commercial sources fund 
regulatory approval processes 105  and manufacturing. 106   Commercial 
inventors are absolutely vital sources of new medical diagnostics, because 
they are the only sources which actually prepare medical products for patient 
                                                                                                                                                              
L. REV. 1553 n. 25 (2006) (indicating that the pharmaceutical industry is highly dependent on public- and 
private-sector contributions). 
101  For example, as more genes are characterized, the more physicians will be able to tailor effective 
pharmaceutical treatments for their patients.  Geoffrey S. Ginsburg & Jeanette J. McCarthy, Personalized 
Medicine: Revolutionizing Drug Discovery and Patient Care, 19 TRENDS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY 491, 491 
(2001). 
102  See Subha Madhavan et al., Rembrandt: Helping Personalized Medicine Become a Reality 
Through Integrative Translational Research, 7 MOLECULAR CANCER RES. 157, 157 (2009) (showing that 
an integrated database of genetic information is more useful to researchers and clinicians than 
independently-discovered genetic links). 
103  According to Ernst and Young, the U.S. biotechnology industry invested approximately 17.2 
billion dollars in R&D.  ERNST & YOUNG, BEYOND BORDERS: GLOBAL BIOTECHNOLOGY REPORT 2012, 
available at http://www.ey.com/GL/en/Industries/Life-Sciences/Beyond-borders---global-biotechnology-
report-2012_Financial-performance-heads-back-to-normal.  In contrast, the amount of money invested in 
research grants by the U.S. National Institutes of Health (“NIH”) was approximately 21 billion dollars.  U.S. 
NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, RESEARCH GRANTS: FUNDING BY INSTITUTE, available at 
http://report.nih.gov/NIHDatabook/Charts/Default.aspx?showm=Y&chartId=206&catId=0.  The NIH’s 
investment represents research grants awarded to all areas of medical research–a vastly more expansive 
field than merely biotechnology.  Only an estimated 5.6 billion dollars of the NIH budget was spent 
funding biotechnology research in 2011.  U.S. NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, ESTIMATES OF FUNDING 
FOR VARIOUS RESEARCH, CONDITION, AND DISEASE CATEGORIES (2013), 
http://report.nih.gov/categorical_spending.aspx (last visited Jan 5, 2013). 
104  Gregory D. Graff et al., The Public-Private Structure of Intellectual Property Ownership in 
Agricultural Biotechnology, 21 NATURE BIOTECH. 989, 989 (2003) (“The economics of R&D in 
agricultural biotechnology have been similar to those of R&D in agrochemicals or pharmaceuticals, with 
universities specializing in basic research but lacking the resources or expertise needed for 
commercialization of products resulting from the new technologies, something which requires substantial 
investments in product development and biosafety testing.”). 
105  The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) is responsible for approving new drugs for 
safety and efficacy.  25 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2006).  Looking at the lists of new drug clearances on the FDA 
website shows that each drug is sponsored by a company, rather than an independent researcher or 
publicly-funded laboratory.  See the pharmaceutical approval listing at DRUGS@FDA, 
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/drugsatfda/index.cfm (last visited May 8, 2013). 
106  See Roy Widdus, Public-Private Partnerships for Health: Their Main Targets, Their Diversity, 
and Their Future Directions, 70 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 713, 718 (2001) (explaining that “the public 
sector lacks expertise and experience . . . in product development, production process development, 
manufacturing, marketing, and distribution”). 
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use.  Every piece of medical technology available in a hospital or medical 
clinic was produced by a company. 
Moreover, it may be impossible to truly separate commercial and non-
commercial sources of genetic research.  Many non-commercial sources of 
scientific advancement are quasi-commercial. 107   That is, patenting and 
licensing are incentives for traditionally non-commercial sources such as 
publicly-funded universities.108  For example, in the United States, the Bayh-
Dole Act enabled universities to patent their employees’ inventions, even if 
those inventions were supported by public funding from the federal 
government.109  This suggests that by removing commercial incentives for 
genetic research (i.e., by eliminating patent eligibility of human gene 
patents), non-commercial sources of genetic research are not capable of 
filling the void left by commercial sources. 
B.     A Major Criticism of Gene Patents: The Anticommons Effect 
Patent law is not without its detractors.  Critics of the assumption that 
patents increase the rate of innovation have postulated that biotechnology 
patents contribute to an “anticommons effect”:  an accumulation of patents 
in the biotechnology space contributes to royalty stacking, which causes 
decreased access to the technology.110  When there are a large number of 
licenses necessary to use a patented technology, a patent “thicket” is 
                                                      
107  David C. Mowery et al., The Growth of Patenting and Licensing by U.S. Universities: An 
Assessment of the Effects of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, 30 RES. POL’Y 99, 101 (2001) (describing the 
historical overlap of U.S. university research and industry); David C. Mowery et al., IVORY TOWER AND 
INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION: UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER BEFORE AND AFTER THE BAYH-
DOLE ACT 2 (2004) (“there is little doubt that U.S. universities now are more heavily and directly involved 
in patenting and licensing of research results than any other time in their history”); see Robert L. Hotz, 
Falling From Grace, Science and the Pursuit of Profit, in WHO OWNS LIFE? 175 (criticizing the overlap of 
industry and public research); Ian Cockburn & Rebecca Henderson, Public-Private Interaction in 
Pharmaceutical Research, 93 PNAS 12725, 12729 (1996). 
108  Pierre Azoulay, Waverly Ding, & Tobey Stuart, The Impact of Academic Patenting on the Rate, 
Quality, and Direction of (Public) Research Output, 57 J. OF INDUS. ECON. 637 (2009); see Lynne G. 
Zucker & Michael R. Darby, Star Scientists and Institutional Transformation: Patterns of Invention and 
Innovation in the Formation of the Biotechnology Industry, 93 PNAS 12709, 12711 (1996) (“In 
biotechnology, early major discoveries were made by star scientists in universities but commercialized in 
[new biotechnology companies].”); see generally Donald S. Siegal, David Waldman, & Albert Link, 
Assessing the Impact of Organizational Practices on the Relative Productivity of University Technology 
Transfer Offices: an Exploratory Study, 32 RES. POL’Y 27 (2003). 
109  35 U.S.C. § 200-212 (1980) (Bayh-Dole Act). 
110  This phenomenon was originally applied to biotechnology in Heller supra, note 4.  See also Jorge 
A. Goldstein, Critical Analysis of Patent Pools, in GENE PATENTS AND COLLABORATIVE LICENSING 
MODELS 50 (Geertrui Van Overwalle ed., 2009); Carmen E. Correa, The SARS Case: IP Fragmentation 
and Patent Pools, in GENE PATENTS AND COLLABORATIVE LICENSING MODELS 42 (Geertrui van Overwalle 
ed., 2009). 
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created.111  Royalty stacking may cause researchers to under-use patented 
technology as well as generally inhibit access to genetic testing 
technology.112  Critics postulate that numerous patents from different sources 
will prevent whole-genome analysis because the complexity of licensing and 
royalty payments will deter entrants into genetic research.113    
Despite these concerns, the anticommons effect has not borne out in 
practice, regardless of the fact many gene patents have been issued. 114  
Licensing of gene patents is widely available in the industry. 115   When 
genetic researchers do not acquire a license, they are still able to conduct 
research in a jurisdiction where the patent holder has not filed a patent, or 
research the gene without a license.116  In practice, given the “secrecy of 
research programs, costs of lost goodwill among researchers, costs of 
litigation, the relatively small damages to be collected from blocking 
research use, and the interest in the patent owner in allowing research 
advances in most cases,” researchers117 are generally not punished for using 
a patented gene without a license. 118 
Additionally, in other potential patent thickets, industry-motivated 
patent pools have dealt with the problem of royalty stacking.  Patent pools 
are agreements between multiple patent owners which allow third parties to 
license all of those patents in a cohesive package.119  In the past, patent pools 
have emerged in other technology markets with overlapping patent rights, 
including markets related to sewing machines,120 aircraft,121 and MPEG-2 
                                                      
111  Birgit Verbeure, Patent Pooling for Gene-Based Diagnostic Testing, in GENE PATENTS AND 
COLLABORATIVE LICENSING MODELS 3 (Geertrui Van Overwalle ed., 2009). 
112  Id. at 3. 
113  Id.; Timothy Caulfield et al., Evidence and Anecdotes: An Analysis of Human Gene Patenting 
Controversies, 24 NATURE BIOTECH. 1091, 1093 (2006) (“The empirical research suggests that the fears of 
wide spread anti-commons that block the use of upstream discoveries have largely not materialized.”). 
114  Caulfield et al., supra note 113 at 1093 (“The empirical research suggests that the fears of wide 
spread anti-commons that block the use of upstream discoveries have largely not materialized.”); 
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL COMMITTEE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN GENOMIC AND 
PROTEIN RESEARCH AND INNOVATION, REAPING THE BENEFITS OF GENOMIC AND PROTEOMIC RESEARCH: 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INNOVATION, AND PUBLIC HEALTH (Stephen A. Merrill & Anne-Marie 
Mazza eds., 2005); MICHAEL M. HOPKINS ET AL., THE PATENTING OF HUMAN DNA: GLOBAL TRENDS IN 
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR ACTIVITY (THE PATGEN PROJECT) (2006), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/patentscope/en/programs/patent_landscapes/documents/patgen_finalreport.pdf 
(describing the effects of patent law on European biotechnology). 
115  Pressman et al., Patenting and Licensing Practices for DNA-Based Patents at U.S. Academic 
Institutions, 24 NATURE BIOTECH. 31 (2005). 
116  Caulfield supra, note 113 at 1093. 
117  This observation applies to non-commercial researchers.  See id. 
118 Id. 
119  Birgit Verbeure, Patent Pooling for Gene-Based Diagnostic Testing, in GENE PATENTS AND 
COLLABORATIVE LICENSING MODELS 3 (Geertrui Van Overwalle ed., 2009). 
120  Id. 
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technology. 122   Scholars have suggested that patent pooling is a natural 
solution to concerns about the potential anti-innovation effects of gene 
patents.123  
C. The Commercial Genetic Testing Industry, Like the Pharmaceutical 
Industry, May be Particularly Dependent on the Patent System 
The needs of the commercial genetic research industry are not entirely 
known, but may be comparable to the pharmaceutical industry.  Even critics 
of patent systems suggest that patent eligibility is more important in certain 
industries.124  One of the industries most dependent on patent protection is 
the pharmaceutical industry.125  This dependence is a product of the high cost 
it takes to bring a new pharmaceutical or biologic to market.126 
                                                                                                                                                              
121  Harry T. Dykman, Patent Licensing Within the Manufacturer’s Aircraft Association, 46 J. PATENT 
OFFICE SOC’Y 646 (1964). 
122  Lawrence A. Horn, Case 1.  The MPEG LA® Licensing Model: What Problem Does It Solve in 
Biopharma and Genetics? in GENE PATENTS AND COLLABORATIVE LICENSING MODELS 33 (Geertrui Van 
Overwalle ed., 2009); see Letter from Joel I. Klein, Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice, 
Antitrust Division, to Gerrard R. Beeney, Esq. (June 26, 1997).   
123  See Ted J. Ebersole, Marvin C. Guthrie, & Jorje A. Goldstein, Patent Pools as a Solution to 
Problems of Diagnostic Genetics, 17 INTELL. PROP. & L. J. 6 (2005); see also JEANNE CLARK ET AL., U.S. 
PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT POOLS: A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF ACCESS IN 
BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENTS? (2000), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/ 
dapp/opla/patentpool.pdf; Verbeure supra note 119 (indicating that patent pooling may be a solution to 
gene patent thickets); Horn, supra note 122. 
124  See Steve P. Calandrillo, An Economic Analysis of Property Rights in Information: Justifications 
and Problems of Exclusive Rights, Incentives to Generate Information, and the Alternative of a 
Government-Run Reward System, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 301, 324 (1998) 
(indicating that monetary awards are necessary to encourage innovation in the pharmaceutical industry, but 
that those awards currently only exist through the patent system). 
125 Adelman, supra note 28 at 905; Hemphill, supra note 100 at 1562 (“almost uniquely, in [the 
pharmaceutical industry] the patent is considered necessary to recoup financial investment”); see Richard E. 
Caves et al., Patent Expiration, Entry, and Competition in the U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry, 
MICROECONOMICS 1, 2 (1991).  The biotechnology industry is also highly dependent on patent protection.  
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents, Product Exclusivity, and Information Dissemination: How Law Directs 
Biopharmaceutical Research and Development, 47 FORDHAM L. REV. 477, 480 (“across the board, this is a 
very patent-sensitive field of research”); Iain M. Cockburn, Intellectual Property Rights and 
Pharmaceuticals: Challenges and Opportunities for Economic Research, ECON. INTELL. PROP. 150, 152, 
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ip-development/en/economics/pdf/wo_1012_e_ch_5.pdf (last 
visited May 1, 2013) (“In this sector . . . patents are the most visible and perhaps most important form of 
intellectual property”).  Patent protection is also generally acknowledged as important in the biotech 
industry.  Rochelle K. Seide & Carmella L. Stephens, Ethical Issues and Application of Patent Laws, in 
WHO OWNS LIFE? 60 (“[In the biotech industry,] patent protection is essential as it reduces commercial 
risks and provides economic incentives to commitment of capital and human resources”). 
126  Stephen M. Paul et al., How to Improve R&D Productivity: the Pharmaceutical Industry’s Great 
Challenge, 9 NATURE REVIEWS DRUG DISCOVERY 203, 203 (2010) (estimating that it takes an investment 
of approximately $1.8 billion to take a drug to market in the U.S.). 
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The considerable cost of producing marketable drugs is a function of 
two factors:  research and development costs,127  and regulatory costs.128  
Research and development costs include the costs of developing drugs that 
ultimately fail to reach the market.129  Like pharmaceutical research, genetic 
research is also incredibly expensive. 130   However, the two markets 
currently have different regulatory approval requirements. 
Genetic discoveries are not subject to pre-market approval processes.  
However, this is likely to change.  Given the potentially broad dependence 
of clinicians on genetic tests, numerous national 131  and international 132 
organizations have called for mandatory regulatory approval for genetic 
tests. Not only do the significant research costs make gene researchers 
dependent on the patent system to protect their inventions so that they can 
recoup their investments, but coming regulatory costs will soon deepen that 
dependence.  
Moreover, the genetic testing industry may be particularly dependent 
on IP protection because genetic tests are so easy to copy.  Like 
pharmaceuticals or biologics, 133  gene-disease correlations can be easily 
                                                      
127  Id. 
128 Eisenberg supra, note 125, at 481 (“a big chunk [of the money it takes to bring a drug to market] 
comes from the costs of conducting clinical trials to win FDA approval”). 
129  Joseph A. DiMasi & Henry G. Grabowski, The Cost of Biopharmaceutical R&D: Is Biotech 
Different? 28 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 469, 471 (2007). 
130  See Isaac C. Kohane, Using Electronic Health Records to Drive Discovery in Disease Genomics, 
12 NATURE REVIEWS GENETICS 417, 417 (2011). 
131  In the United States, representatives from the National Institutes of Health and the Food and Drug 
Administration have suggested that pre-market approval for genetic tests is warranted.  Margaret A. 
Hamburg & Francis S. Collins, The Path to Personalized Medicine, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 301 (2010) 
(expressing that the U.S. Food and Drug Administration and the National Institutes of Health are planning 
to regulate the genetic testing industry as genetic tests become a more standard diagnostic tool in medicine).  
In 1998, Australia and New Zealand entered into the Trans Tasman Mutual Recognition Agreement, which 
explicitly established regulatory approval processes for genetic testing services.  Trans-Tasman Mutual 
Recognition Act 1997 (Cth.) (Austl.).  In addition, given that the Australian Pharmaceutical Benefits 
Scheme independently evaluates genetic tests for efficacy, there is currently a measure of regulatory costs 
for firms that own genetic tests and who want those tests covered under Medicare. See infra Part IV.C; see 
also Case Study: Australia, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION GENOMIC RESOURCE CENTRE, available at 
http://www.who.int/genomics/policy/australia/en/index.html (last visited May 8, 2013). 
132  See, e.g., Quality & Safety in Genetic Testing: An Emerging Concern, WORLD HEALTH 
ORGANIZATION, http://www.who.int/genomics/policy/quality_safety/en/index.html (last visited May 8, 
2013) (describing the World Health Organization’s activities promoting quality assurance in genetic 
testing). 
133  Hemphill supra note 100 (indicating that pharmaceutical patents are also an “information good” 
because it is “relatively straightforward and cheap for others to manufacture” pharmaceuticals after they 
have been publicly disclosed). 
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applied to new patients after they are discovered.134  Unlike pharmaceutical 
or biologic inventions, which require significant investment to copy,135  a 
gene-disease correlation could be applied to new patients easily after the 
sequence and location is publicly disclosed.136  
As a result of high development and impending regulatory costs, as 
well as the fact that genetic discoveries are easy to copy, the commercial 
genetic research industry is only possible with some form of IP protection 
for its inventions.  Since patents establish exclusive licenses in the hands of 
the inventors, patent law enables inventors to exclude copiers and thus profit 
from the patented technology without competing with unscrupulous copiers.  
Currently, patent and trade secret protection offer the only viable sources of 
IP protection for genetic research firms.137  Thus, many scholars believe that 
human gene patents are important to the commercial genetic research 
industry.138 
D. Australia’s “Raising the Bar” Act Attenuates the Fear of Royalty 
Stacking and Contributes to a Particularly Effective Patent System 
Both the ALRC139 and the ACIP140 recommended that an experimental 
use defense to patent infringement would promote scientific research in 
Australia.141  In 2011, Parliament passed the Raising the Bar Act,142 which 
generally exempts non-commercial researchers from patent infringement.143 
                                                      
134  See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303, 1315 
(Fed. Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S.Ct. 694 (U.S. Nov. 30, 2012) (No. 12-398) (explaining that three of 
the plaintiffs in the case could “immediately” begin BRCA testing in their medical laboratories). 
135  Biologic products are considered more difficult to copy than pharmaceutical products.  See Val 
Brickates Kennedy, Amgen CEO Assesses Generic Threat, MARKETWATCH, Mar. 1, 2006, 
http://articles.marketwatch.com/2006-03-01/news/30800936_1_aranesp-amgen-ceo-biotechnology-drugs 
(last visited May 1, 2013). 
136  See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303, 1315 
(Fed. Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S.Ct. 694 (U.S. Nov. 30, 2012) (No. 12-398). 
137  Trade secret protection is essentially available over any information that can be kept a secret.  
Patent protection is, of course, already available for isolated DNA sequences. See supra, Part II.A. 
138  See, e.g., Christopher M. Holman, The Impact of Human Gene Patents on Innovation and Access: 
A Survey of Human Gene Patent Litigation, 76 UMKC L.R. 295, 356 (2007) (“the use of these [gene 
patents] to incentivize the development of this increasingly important class of drugs would likely support 
an argument in favor of allowing gene patents”); Glen McGee, Gene Patents Can be Ethical, 7 CAMBRIDGE 
Q. OF HEALTHCARE ETHICS 417, 419 (2000); 
139  Intellectual Property Laws Amendment (Raising the Bar) Bill 2011 Explanatory Memorandum, 
para. 24. 
140  Id. at para. 23. 
141  For a more thorough discussion of these recommendations, see Part II (A). 
142  Raising the Bar Act 2012 (Cth.) (Austl.). 
143  Raising the Bar Act 2012, (Cth.) s 119C (Austl.). 
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This Act allows unauthorized use of patented technology, so long as it 
is for non-commercial research purposes. 144   The Act’s explanatory 
memorandum noted that, while the patent system “exists to encourage 
innovation and promote the dissemination of technical knowledge,”145 the 
“benefits of this system are diminished where there is uncertainty about the 
extent to which patent rights impinge on freedom to do research.”146  Thus, it 
created a statutory experimental use exception, which exempts researchers 
from patent infringement if the research is conducted “as part of discovering 
new information or testing a principle or supposition.”147 
In order to preserve the commercial value of patents, the experimental 
use exception does not apply to research activities with a “predominantly 
commercial purpose.”148  Patents on research tools are also not subject to the 
experimental use exception, because those tools are developed for the 
purpose of commercially exploiting basic research.149  
In effect, this law creates an exemption that prevents gene patent 
thickets from developing in non-commercial research settings by allowing 
non-commercial researchers to use patented technology without the threat of 
a patent infringement suit.  Given that one of the major concerns of human 
gene patents is that patent eligibility stalls non-commercial genetic 
research, 150  Australia has effectively circumvented a major utilitarian 
argument against gene patents.  As a result, Australia’s patent system is 
uniquely situated to promote innovation in genetic research.  If there is a 
patent system where gene patents can incentivize genetic research, Australia 
is it.151 
IV. COUNTRIES LIKE AUSTRALIA ARE NOT CURRENTLY INCENTIVIZED TO 
PROTECT HUMAN GENES IN THEIR RESPECTIVE PATENT SYSTEMS 
Given ongoing discussion over gene patents in Parliament and the 
courts, Australia is still in a position to evaluate whether gene patents are 
good for its citizens.  This section proposes that, while gene patents 
throughout the world may be a good thing, it would be rational for Australia 
                                                      
144  Raising the Bar Act 2012 (Cth.) (Austl.). 
145 Intellectual Property Laws Amendment (Raising the Bar) Bill 2011 Explanatory Memorandum, 
Acts for Experimental Purposes, s 119C. 
146  Id. 
147  Id. 
148  Id. 
149  Id. 
150  See supra, Part III.B. 
151  Scherer, supra note 94 (indicating that a research exemption can boost technological innovation in 
genetic research). 
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to eliminate gene patents.  Section A frames the international benefits of 
patent law.  Section B explains why TRIPS is unlikely to interfere with a 
potential decision to eliminate gene patents.  Section C introduces 
Australia’s universal healthcare system, which may shoulder the costs of 
patented genetic tests.  Section D proposes a game theory model which 
shows that Australia is currently in a position where it would be more 
rational to eliminate gene patents than keep them. 
A. Benefits of Each Patent System Are Felt by the Entire World, Whereas 
Costs of Each Patent System Are Felt Only by the Administering State 
Patent laws are determined in individual countries.  Despite the 
immense amount of import-export transactions, and the rapid information 
sharing enabled by the Internet, patents are only enforceable in the country 
where they are filed and granted.  
Previously, this comment argued patent law aims to incentivize 
innovation152  and encourage inventors to disclose their inventions to the 
public.  Disclosure, in turn, brings the rest of the industry up to speed on 
novel advancements in a particular technological area.  This encourages 
innovation by both educating the industry and preventing wasteful research 
investments on technologies that have already been invented. 
Disclosure is the key to the benefits of patent law.  However, 
disclosing an invention in one country also discloses that invention in other 
countries.  For example, records of U.S. patents are widely available on the 
USPTO website,153 whether accessed from within the United States or from 
Australia.  Thus, researchers in Australia also benefit from the U.S. patent 
system.  Similarly, Australian patents are accessible online from the United 
States.154  
However, the costs of each country’s patent system are only directly 
felt by commercial actors in that jurisdiction.  For example, patents in the 
U.S. are not enforceable in Australia.155  If a company fully disclosed a gene-
disease discovery and acquired a U.S. patent as a result of that disclosure, 
and Australia did not grant a patent on that disclosure, Australian businesses 
would be free to profit from tests for that gene without compensating the 
                                                      
152  See supra Part III.A. 
153  To search U.S. patents or patent applications, see http://www.uspto.gov/patents/process/search/. 
154  Australian patents can be accessed via AusPat: http://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/auspat/index.htm. 
155  See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006); see also Patents Act 1990 (Cth.) s 13(3) (Austl.). 
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U.S. patent holder. 156  The American company would also be without 
recourse in Australian courts.  
Ultimately, patent laws are established by individual countries.  
However, the benefits of establishing patent laws extend beyond the borders 
of those countries.  Therefore, utilitarian models concerning patent laws of 
any sort should be designed with an international perspective.   In fact, 
international agreements which seek to unify patent law to some extent do 
exist:  most importantly, through the World Trade Organization (“WTO”).  
B. TRIPS Does not Necessarily Compel WTO Members to Protect 
Human Genes Through Patents 
A major condition for WTO membership is acceptance and ratification 
of the TRIPS agreement.157  TRIPS is a multilateral agreement that partially 
unifies patent law across WTO members.158 
Opponents of gene patents are constrained by Article 33 of TRIPS, 
which prevents any member from discriminating against any area of 
technology.  This prevents nations from specifically excluding areas of 
technology from patent eligibility.  Thus, if Australia sought to specifically 
exclude isolated DNA inventions from patent eligibility, it would potentially 
be subject to WTO sanctions.159 
However, there are several exceptions to TRIPS Article 33.  Article 27 
of TRIPS allows member states to exclude certain inventions from 
patentability if it is “necessary to protect ordre public or morality.”160  Given 
the profound controversy surrounding gene patents throughout the world, 
Australia might be justified in eliminating gene patents via legislation under 
Article 27 of TRIPS by arguing that ownership of human genes is contrary 
to public morality.  TRIPS also allows member states to block patentability 
of diagnostic techniques.161  Commercial firms like Myriad Genetics use 
                                                      
156  See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006); see also Patents Act 1990 (Cth.) s 13(3) (Austl.). 
157  Overview: The TRIPS Agreement, World Trade Organization, http://www.wto.org/english/ 
tratop_e/trips_e/intel2_e.htm (last visited May 8, 2013). 
158  Id.;  see J.H. Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property Protection under 
the TRIPS Component of the WTO Agreement, 29 INT’L L. 345 (1995). 
159  TRIPS Article 44 empowers judges to order injunctions for violations of the agreement.  
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 44, Apr. 5 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1197, 
1215.  Article 45 empowers judges to order payment of monetary damages in certain cases.  Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 45, Apr. 5 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1197, 1215. 
160  Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 27.2, Apr. 5 1994, 33 
I.L.M. 1197, 1208. 
161  Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 27.3(a), Apr. 5 1994, 33 
I.L.M. 1197, 1208. 
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gene patents primarily for diagnostic purposes.162  If Parliament blocked the 
use of gene patents for diagnostic tests, it would fall squarely into the 
language of the diagnostic test exception.163   
These exceptions to TRIPS render Article 33 moot in the gene patent 
debate.  Despite the aim of encouraging uniform patent protection across the 
developed world, TRIPS is unlikely to bar countries like Australia from 
eliminating gene patents. 
A successful judicial challenge to the validity of human gene patents 
would also not violate TRIPS.  The challenges to gene patent validity in the 
United States and Australia assert that isolated DNA inventions are not 
patent eligible under the existing patent law regimes of those jurisdictions. 
164  Thus, the WTO could find that isolated DNA inventions are not patent 
eligible, so long as the theory is based on a non-discriminatory, existing 
general law of patent eligibility. 
Ultimately, the language of TRIPS does not appear to apply to a 
judicial or parliamentary decision to eliminate gene patents.  Despite the fact 
that TRIPS was created to establish uniform patent laws, due to its extensive 
exceptions, it does not compel uniformity in the gene patents arena. 
C. Australia’s Expansive Healthcare Coverage for Its Citizens Provides a 
Direct Cost to Recognizing Healthcare-Related Patents 
The Australian government provides universal healthcare to its 
citizens though a system called Medicare.165  Medicare was established (in 
                                                      
162  Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303, 1314 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S.Ct. 694 (U.S. Nov. 30, 2012) (No. 12-398). 
163  Under Article 27.3(a) of TRIPS, member states may exclude “from patentability . . . diagnostic, 
therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of humans or animals.”  Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 27.3(a), Apr. 5 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1197, 1208.  Additionally, 
Article 8 (which allows public health considerations while designing patent laws) combined with Article 31 
(which allows the granting of compulsory licenses in certain healthcare related patents) suggests that WTO 
member states could essentially ignore gene patents that they find particularly problematic.  Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 8, Apr. 5 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1197, 1201; Agreement 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 31, Apr. 5 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1197, 1209.  For a 
more thorough discussion of the potential gene patent-related exceptions to the general bar against 
technology discrimination under TRIPS, see Lori B. Andrews, Genes and Patent Policy: Rethinking 
Intellectual Property Rights, 3 NATURE REVIEWS GENETICS 803, 807 (2002).  See also, Alan O. Sykes, 
TRIPs, Pharmaceuticals, Developing Countries, and the Doha “Solution,” JOHN M. OLIN LAW & 
ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER no. 140, 7 (discussing the methods that developing countries use to relax 
pharmaceutical patent rights under TRIPS if the patents are deemed injurious to public health). 
164  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office, 689 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S.Ct. 694 (U.S. Nov. 30, 2012) (No. 12-
398). 
165  Medicare, AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, http://www.human 
services.gov.au/customer/information/welcome-medicare-customers-website. (last visited May 1, 2013). 
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its modern form) in 1983 with the passage of the Health Legislation 
Amendment Act 1983.   
Medicare administers the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme 
(“PBS”),166 which is responsible for subsidizing individual treatments and 
diagnostics.  If the administrators of Medicare determine that a particular 
diagnostic test is essential to the distribution of healthcare to Australian 
citizens, it directly subsidizes that test through PBS.167 
Since patents create limited monopolies, on-patent technologies are 
almost universally more expensive than off-patent technologies.  That is, 
since patents put exclusive licenses in the hands of the inventor, the inventor 
is free to charge whatever she chooses for use of the patented technology.  In 
many cases, the premium for patented technology is passed down directly to 
the consumer.  However, the “consumer” in the medical industry is 
effectively the government in countries which heavily subsidize medical 
diagnostics for patients.   
In this case, the Australian government sets patent policy, 168  and 
subsidizes medical tests through PBS.  In effect, by allowing patents on 
medical technologies, the government directly pays more.  Patents on human 
genes represent a direct cost to any government which subsidizes healthcare 
costs for its citizens.169 
D. Under a Game Theory Model, Countries like Australia Are 
Incentivized to Eliminate Healthcare-Related Patents like Human 
Gene Patents 
Game theory is a popular way to evaluate the rationality of different 
possible decisions.170  Game theory enables policy-makers, among others, to 
weigh the benefits of an actor’s potential decisions under different 
circumstances, and design policies that promote rational decision-makers to 
perform the actions that the policy-makers prefer. 
Under a game theory model, the overall payoff to Australia for 
recognizing gene patents is the difference of the benefit of doing so, minus 
                                                      
166  National Health Act 1953 (Cth) (Austl.); National Health (Pharmaceutical Benefits) Regulations 
1960 (Cth) (Austl.). 
167  For an explanation of the process required to get a medical product listed on PBS, see the PBS 
website at http://www.pbs.gov.au/info/industry/listing/listing-steps. 
168  For example, this can happen through Parliament.  See supra Part II.A.  
169  In fact, similar pressure incentivized the Canadian province of Ontario to offer its own genetic test 
for the BRCA genes, in violation of Myriad’s valid Canadian patent.  See Laura Eggerston, Ontario Defies 
US Firm’s Genetic Patent, Continues Cancer Screening, 166 CMAJ 494 (2002). 
170  For an introduction to game theory as applied to legal issues, see Douglas G. Baird et al., GAME 
THEORY AND THE LAW (1994). 
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the costs.  The benefits are comprised of the acceleration171 in research due 
to the rest of the world’s protection of gene patents (“A(w)”) as well as the 
acceleration in domestic research accrued by Australia because of its 
enforcement for gene patents (“A(a)”).  The direct cost of Australia’s 
recognition of gene patents is equal to the increase in healthcare spending 
through Medicare and the PBS (“C”).  Assuming that the rest of the world 
recognizes gene patents, Australia’s most rational decision depends on 
weighing the benefit produced by Australia’s relatively small contribution to 
the global genetic testing market against the costs accrued by the Australia 
government for paying for expensive, on-patent genetic tests. 
Table 1 represents a payoff matrix for both Australia and the world.  
The decisions of the world are represented by the vertical axis.  The 
decisions of Australia are represented by the horizontal axis.  The first 
quantity in each box represents the payoff to Australia, and the second 
quantity represents the payoff to the rest of the world. 
 
TABLE 1 
Patentable Unpatentable 
Patentable A(a) + A(w) - C(a)172  A(w) 
Unpatentable A(a) - C(a) 0 
 
Variable A(a) represents the acceleration of innovation due to 
Australia’s market contribution, and A(w) represents the acceleration of 
innovation due to the rest of the world’s market contribution, where A(w) is 
much greater than A(a).  Variable C(a) represents the direct costs to the 
Australian government as a result of paying for more expensive, on-patent 
genetic tests.173   
Given the variety of different payouts for Australia, it is necessary to 
consider its decision to cooperate or defect in the context of the other 
“player’s” decision.  In this case, the other player is the world.  If the rest of 
                                                      
171  See supra Part III.A. 
172  In this model, it would be rational to declare gene patents invalid in Australia if C(a) < A(a) + 
A(w).  However, if the United States eliminates gene patents altogether, it is more likely that gene patents 
would be irrational in Australia, because the inequality would change to C(a) < A(a). 
173  This author assumes that the cost of on-patent genetic tests are much more protracted in the United 
States.  The two primary regimes where the U.S. government pays for healthcare costs are Medicaid and 
Medicare.  As far as this author knows, Medicaid does not yet cover non-emergency genetic tests such as 
BRCA1 and BRCA2.  Medicare patients are primarily middle-aged and older, which is a population where 
genetic tests like BRCA1 and BRCA2 are no longer nearly as relevant; if members of that population are 
carriers, they will be beyond an age where prophylactic treatment will have an effect.  While it is true that 
heightened costs are detrimental to the U.S. government in less direct ways (for example possible loss in 
tax revenue), those costs are not addressed here. 
776 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 22 NO. 3 
 
the world eliminates gene patents, then Australia can choose the payouts in 
the right column.  Either Australia can decide to boost the worldwide 
innovation and incur more costly healthcare services (by recognizing gene 
patents, top-right choice), or it can follow along with the rest of the world 
and defect (by not recognizing gene patents, bottom-right choice).  Given 
that Australia’s healthcare market is small compared to the rest of the 
world,174 it seems unlikely that a robust biotech industry could be sustained 
by only Australian consumers.  Incurring the costs of paying for more 
expensive genetic tests would also put Australia at a disadvantage as 
compared to other countries–which would still reap the benefits of 
Australian protection175 without incurring the increased costs of healthcare 
services that patent protection would cause.  In this sense, it seems perfectly 
reasonable to assume that if all other countries defect, Australia would 
rationally decide to also defect and not recognize gene patents.176 
If the rest of the world decides to recognize gene patents, then 
Australia’s choice falls between the two payouts in the left column.  In this 
case, Australia receives the benefit of the boost to innovation that is provided 
by the worldwide genetic diagnosis market regardless of if it recognizes 
gene patents itself.  Acting rationally, Australia should not recognize gene 
patents in the event that the world recognizes gene patents. 
 Both situations favor defection.  In decision theory terms, Australia’s 
dominant strategy is defection.177  Of more concern, Australia’s decision is 
not unlike that of other developed nations with significant healthcare 
markets.  This suggests that it is rational for these countries to defect–despite 
the fact that worldwide recognition of gene patents may be a common good.  
                                                      
174  See Gerard F. Anderson et al., Health Care Spending and use of Information Technology in OECD 
Countries, 25 HEALTH AFF. 819, 820 (2006) (describing the per capita spending on health care by 
country, including Australia and the U.S.).  See also Australia, WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/co
untry/australia (last visited Feb. 5, 2013) (listing the population of Australia as 22.62 million.  But cf. 
United States, WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/country/united-states (last accessed Feb. 5, 2013) 
(listing the population of the U.S. as 311.6 million).  Not only does the United States spend more per capita 
on health care, but it also has a substantially higher population than Australia.  Thus, Australia’s health care 
market is much smaller than the United States’, which means that Australia’s health care market is small 
compared to the worldwide market (which includes many other countries in addition to the U.S.) relating to 
health care services. 
175  Mainly, the benefits of patenting a technology focus on disclosure.  See supra Part III. 
176  Mathematically, this conclusion is represented by the following inequality:  A(a) – C(a) < 0; or 
A(a) < C(a). 
177  While the model in this section assumes that the game is only played once, dominant strategies do 
not change with game iterations. 
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Thus, despite the mutual benefit of cooperation, countries are incentivized to 
defect.178 
 
V. WHOLE-GENOME SEQUENCING WILL EFFECTIVELY ELIMINATE HUMAN 
GENE PATENTS REGARDLESS OF WHETHER CURRENT LEGAL 
CHALLENGES TO THE PATENT ELIGIBILITY OF GENE PATENTS SUCCEED 
Growing success in genetic sequencing technology threaten the 
viability of gene patents.  Gene patents are only valuable so long as it is 
necessary to use the physical isolated DNA molecule179 to perform a process 
such as a genetic test.  However, recent changes threaten to replace the need 
to isolate DNA molecules in order to test for individual genes.  This section 
explores the likely outcome of such developments and concludes that the 
gene patent debate will ultimately be mooted by developing technology.  
Regardless of the success of challenging patents on isolated DNA, 
researchers will soon be able to test for patented genes without directly 
infringing on those patents.  Section A outlines the ongoing development and 
viability of whole-genome sequencing.  Section B explains why whole-
genome sequencing is problematic to gene patent proponents. 
A. The Development of Genome Sequencing and the Limits of Gene 
Patent Infringement 
Gene patents are currently useful in controlling access to 
corresponding genetic tests.  However, this control may be limited as genetic 
testing moves away from PCR.  This section explores developing 
alternatives to PCR–methods which do not require the production of isolated 
DNA.  The value of isolated DNA patents that represent human genes is the 
ability of the patent holder to exclude other parties from testing for that 
gene.  To reiterate, “gene” patents as they currently stand are not patents on 
the genes within genomes, but rather, they are on “distinct molecular 
entities” that enable genetic testing services to test for a given gene within an 
individual’s genome.180 
                                                      
178  Note that despite the fact that the model predicts that countries like Australia are not incentivized 
to recognize gene patents, they certainly do at the moment.  It appears that this is the result of historical 
accident.  Existing Australian patent laws allowed the patent eligibility of isolated DNA. See supra Part 
II.A and Part II.B.  Gene patent opponents then were faced with arguing that the government has to take 
affirmative steps to eliminate isolated DNA from patent eligibility.  The results of this argument are 
pending, given the judicial appeal and parliamentary advocacy.  See supra Part II.A. 
179  This analysis also extends to isolated DNA equivalents under the doctrine of equivalents. 
180  See supra Part II.A. 
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However, many developing methods of genomic sequencing do not 
require the use of isolated DNA fragments.  The Archon X-Prize, 181 
established in 2006, is a competition that has agreed to award $10 million to 
the first group of researchers who can sequence 100 human genomes in a 
given time, 182  with a certain level of accuracy, 183  and under a given 
budget.184  Unlike traditional genetic tests, whole-genome sequencing refers 
to a process that reduces a person’s entire genome into its ordered sequence 
of DNA monomers. 185   Whole-genome sequencing does not require 
independent gene testing via PCR.186  As of 2013, two teams have signed up 
to compete for the prize, which signals incredible development in whole-
genome sequencing technology.187 
Team Ion Torrent will compete using ion semiconductor sequencing.  
Ion semiconductor sequencing is an emerging whole-genome sequencing 
method. 188   Unlike PCR, the process does not produce isolated DNA 
sequences.  It takes naturally-occurring patient DNA and sequences it 
                                                      
181  The Archon X-Prize website is available at http://genomics.xprize.org/. 
182  The prize will be awarded to the first team to sequence 100 genomes in less than thirty days. Larry 
Kedes & Grant Campany, The New Date, New Format, New Goals and New Sponsor of the Archon 
Genomics X PRIZE Competition, 43 NATURE GENETICS 1055, 1055 (2011). 
183  Id. (“no more than 1 error per 1,000,000 bases”). 
184  Id. ($1,000 per genome or less”). 
185  Frequently Asked Questions, ARCHON X-PRIZE, http://genomics.xprize.org/competition-
details/frequently-asked-questions.  
186 Theoretically, under Australian patent law, defendants may “infringe in substance,” even if they do 
not infringe directly.  This theory is similar, but less expansive, than the United States theory of 
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.  In PhotoCure ASA v Queen’s University at Kingston 
[2005] FCA 344, the Federal Court of Australia adopted the U.K.’s version of infringement in substance.  
See Improver Corporation v Remington Consumer Products Limited [1990] FSR 181 at 189.  If the variant 
“has a material effect on the way the invention works,” then it is outside of the scope of the claim.  
Photocure at 195.  If the variant is nonobvious at the time of the claim, then it is outside of the scope of the 
claim.  Id. If a “reader skilled in the art nevertheless have understood from the language of the claim that 
the patentee intended that strict compliance with the primary meaning was an essential requirement of the 
invention,” then uses beyond the primary meaning are outside of the claim.  Id.  Given that gene patents in 
Australia specifically recite limitations of isolated DNA, (see supra Part II.C) and the Federal Court of 
Australia recently confirmed that isolated DNA limitations are necessary for their patent eligibility (see 
supra Part II.C), it is unlikely that a genetic test that does not physically use the patented molecule would 
infringe on the gene patent. 
187 Teams, ARCHON GENOMICS X-PRIZE, http://genomics.xprize.org/teams. 
188  The technological basis for the sequencer that will be used by Ion Torrent in the Archon X-Prize 
competition this year was published in Nature in 2011:  Jonathan M. Rothberg, An Integrated 
Semiconductor Device Enabling Non-Optical Genome Sequencing, 475 NATURE 348 (2011).  This 
sequence method requires a patient’s native DNA to be suspended in a solution with deoxyribonucleotide 
triphosphate (“dNTP”) molecules.  The process induces DNA replication, which causes each DNA strand 
to separate.  Four types of dNTP molecules are used–which match the four types of DNA nucleotides.  
During the induced replication process, the dNTP molecule that complements the template strand attaches 
to the template, releasing a hydrogen ion.  The hydrogen ion is sensed using an ion-sensitive field-effect 
transistor ion sensor.  The process is incredibly rapid, and performed on a microfluidic platform.   
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directly.  Since gene patents are not on the sequence, but rather on isolated 
DNA with a matching sequence, researchers can sequence whole genomes 
using ion semiconductor sequencing without infringing on any gene patents. 
The Wyss Institute at Harvard University, led by the renowned 
geneticist Dr. George Church, has also agreed to compete in the X-Prize 
competition this year.189  Although the Wyss Institute has not shared what 
sort of sequencing method it will use in the competition, Dr. Church’s 
research group is known for developing polony sequencing.190  This method 
divides up patient DNA into random segments, and sequences each segment 
using an imaging method.191  It uses two types of DNA fragments:  existing 
proprietary primers, and chopped-up genomic DNA samples to be 
sequenced.  Neither of those fragments, however, necessarily must match 
genes at all. Consequently, polony sequencing is another method in which 
gene patents do not necessarily inhibit genetic analysis.  
Neither technology is common in clinical practice.  However, if either 
technology is advanced enough to win the Archon X-Prize, medical practice 
would be one step nearer to utilizing widespread whole-genome sequencing.  
While no one can say with certainty that the teams can meet the technical 
standards of the prize, the teams are optimistic.192   
B. Widespread Whole-Genome Sequencing Will Render Human Gene 
Patents Effectively Valueless 
Whole-genome sequencing methods have the potential to make gene 
patents valueless because they do not require the use of patented isolated 
DNA sequences.  Even if Australia and other countries continue to recognize 
gene patents as they currently stand, the gene patent regime will not 
incentivize genetic research at all when whole-genome sequencing becomes 
common practice–because gene patents will be incredibly easy to design 
around. 
Cheap and fast genetic sequencing is inevitable.193  When it comes 
into popular use, companies will no longer be able to use patents on isolated 
                                                      
189  Wyss Institute Team at Harvard University, ARCHON GENOMICS X-PRIZE, 
http://genomics.xprize.org/teams/wyss-institute-team. 
190  See Jay Shendure et al., Accurate Multiplex Polony Sequencing of an Evolved Bacterial Genome, 
309 SCI. 1728 (2005). 
191  Id. at 1729. 
192  Life Technologies to Compete in $10 Million Archon Genomics X PRIZE, ARCHON GENOMICS X-
PRIZE (2013), http://genomics.xprize.org/media/press-releases/life-technologies-compete-10-million-
archon-genomics-x-prize. 
193  The X-Prize foundation, which seeks to encourage the development of a cheap and fast genetic 
sequencing technology, seems to be approaching a level of success.  See the foundation’s website at 
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DNA to exclude others from testing for the human genes.194  This is due to a 
fundamental difference in technology, rather than law; PCR tests require the 
use of isolated DNA that matches the targeted gene, 195  while genetic 
sequencing does not. 
Whether nations decide that gene patents are important to genetic 
research or not, advances in genetic sequencing technology will make that 
choice for them.  If human gene patents cannot be used to control testing for 
patented genes, then they will effectively lose value.  Proponents of gene 
patents, who may believe that the incentives contained within gene patents 
are necessary to incentivize and pay for genetic research, 196   should be 
concerned with the developments of whole genome sequencing.  Without  a 
viable method of both encouraging disclosure of genetic discoveries, and 
ensuring the return on investment for regulatory approval processes, it is 
difficult to see how a commercial enterprise would continue to invest in 
genetic research.197 
Moreover, proponents of gene patents will be forced to switch from 
defense to advocacy.  Present patent laws in Australia and the United States 
are not equipped to protect genetic research investments from whole-genome 
sequencing.  Proponents will be forced to convince independent nations to 
take affirmative steps to expand protection over human genes.  By doing 
nothing, the impending success of viable whole-genome sequencing will 
render gene patents ineffective for encouraging commercial genetic research.  
However, proponents are facing an uphill battle:  given the fact that 
countries like Australia are encouraged to eliminate gene patents 
altogether,198 it may be extraordinarily difficult to convince countries like 
Australia to go out of their way to protect human genes under the patent 
system.  Opponents, on the other hand, are advantaged by these 
developments.  Rather than suing over the validity of isolated DNA patents, 
opponents may serve their cause more effectively by supporting the 
development of whole-genome sequencing. 
Proponents have a problem.  Even if the gene patent challenges in the 
United States and Australia fail, gene patents will be in effect defeated with 
                                                                                                                                                              
xprize.org.  For the 2013 competition, multiple teams with allegedly qualifying inventions have entered the 
X-Prize competition.  Quite generally, the X-Prize competition is viewed as the gateway into personalized 
medicine:  if an invention is capable of meeting the foundation’s specifications, then it would be cost-
effective for major health insurance providers to sequence patient genomes as a method of routine care.  
194 See supra Part V.A. 
195 See supra Part I.C. 
196 See supra Part III. 
197 See supra Part III.A and Part.C. 
198 See supra Part IV (D). 
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the development of fast and inexpensive whole-genome sequencing.  
Proponents should focus on asking individual jurisdictions to broaden 
intellectual property protection on human genes. 
VI. IN ORDER TO INCENTIVIZE COMMERCIAL INVESTMENT IN GENETIC 
RESEARCH, AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT PROVIDING FOR THE IP 
PROTECTION OF HUMAN GENES IS NECESSARY 
Given that disclosure in a single given jurisdiction means that anyone 
in the world can access that information, it is appropriate for patent law 
policy to be considered on a global scale.199  As discussed in Part IV, TRIPS 
does little to prevent countries such as Australia from “defecting” by 
refusing to acknowledge gene patents.   
According to scholars, the goal of any law–domestic or international–
is to prevent games with an equilibrium point of mutual defection. 200  
Unfortunately, TRIPS fails to motivate countries like Australia to maintain 
patent protection for human genes.201 
Proponents of gene patents must advocate for a new protective regime 
for human genes.  Given that the industrialized world has something to gain 
from gene patents, and yet if countries like Australia behave rationally they 
would not recognize gene patents, 202  a new international regime is 
appropriate in this case.  Several alternatives have been discussed, including 
the possibility:  A) that human genes should be protected in a new, non-
patent intellectual property regime, B) that human genes should be protected 
in a reformed international patent regime, or C) that nations should come 
together to consolidate regulatory approval, and facilitate paying for 
regulatory approval through public funding.  Each possible solution is 
discussed in brief below. 
                                                      
199 See supra Part IV.A. 
200  See Bartosz Brozek, The Normativity of Law, in STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, VOLUME 7: 
GAME THEORY AND THE LAW (Jerzy Stelmach & Wojciech Zaluski eds., 2011). 
201  See supra Part IV.D. 
202  See supra Part IV. 
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A. Protecting Human Genes Through an Alternative Intellectual Property 
Regime 
First, countries may decide to create a new intellectual property 
regime for human genes. 203   Proponents argue that an international 
agreement that protects genetic discoveries from being freely used is the 
most appropriate solution. 204   Some proponents describe putting genetic 
discoveries in an international “trust,” administered by an international 
organization that could assist licensing agreements.205   
In terms of the game theory model, it would still increase the rate of 
innovation, because it would directly reward researchers who discover new 
genes.  However, it would not eliminate the drawbacks of gene patents, such 
as the problem of increased healthcare expenditures.  The balance between 
those two variables depends on how the policy values this new form of 
intellectual property. 
The agreements would have to be lucrative enough to encourage 
commercial investment in genetic research, in order to incentivize 
investments by commercial sources.  However, ultimately the costs of 
genetic tests protected under an alternative intellectual property regime 
would be paid by medical insurance providers, including (particularly in 
Australia’s case) governments because of healthcare subsidies.  In addition, 
creating a new intellectual property regime may introduce unnecessary 
complexity into international intellectual property policy.  It begs the 
question of whether the same goal could be served by simply using the 
patent system–which individual nations and industries know and understand. 
B. Protecting Genetic Discoveries Through the Patent System 
Another alternative is to reform TRIPS or WIPO agreements to cover 
genetic sequence information through the patent system.  Present domestic 
patent systems do not protect genetic sequences.206 
                                                      
203  See Looney, supra note 2.  See also, Janet Hope, Open Source Genetics: Conceptual Framework, 
in GENE PATENTS AND COLLABORATIVE LICENSING MODELS 171 (Geertrui van Overwalle ed., 2009) 
(describing an open source model for genetic research). 
204  See Looney, supra note 2. 
205  Id. at 268. 
206  For example, in Australia, the Patents Act of 1990 only allows “articles of manufacture” to be 
patented.  Gene-disease correlations are more akin to discoveries or ideas, rather than physical “articles of 
manufacture.”  Thus, Australian patent law is not equipped to protect genes once genome sequencing 
becomes the standard of practice.  Patents Act 1990 (Cth) (Austl.).  Even in the United States, the current 
Myriad Genetics case controversy revolves around the patentability of isolated DNA, rather than the human 
genes themselves.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and 
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This is not the first time that there is a developing area of technology 
that apparently will not be protected by common patent systems.  In the 
1930s, the U.S. Congress recognized that life forms were not patentable, but 
research into life forms should be encouraged through the patent system.207  
As a result, it created a separate patent regime for plants.208  The plant patent 
regime is still in effect today, and is attributable for dramatic improvements 
in U.S. agricultural yields since the 1930s.209   
Using U.S. plant patents as an example, WIPO or the WTO could 
establish a separate patent regime for genetic discoveries.  With this new 
regime, WIPO or WTO could manipulate the duration of gene patents, or 
impose compulsory licensing schemes.  A new patent regime could give 
organizations and nations more flexibility to increase or reduce the scope of 
patent protection for human genes.  Given that genetic research is a 
particularly young field of biotechnology, flexibility is particularly 
important.   
One major limitation is getting member states to agree to a novel and 
untested system. 210   The other potential problem is that patent law 
traditionally does not have a fair use exception–which can create inadvertent 
infringement.211  However, a new gene patent regime could be created in a 
way to address this concern.  
                                                                                                                                                              
Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S.Ct. 694 (U.S. Nov. 30, 2012) 
(No. 12-398). 
207  See also former Chief Justice Burger’s analysis of how the plant patent system was meant to 
protect naturally-derived plants under patent law, because natural plants were not otherwise patent eligible, 
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 131 (1980). 
208  Plant Patent Act of 1930, ch. 497, 46 Stat. 703 (1930) (later developed into 35 U.S.C. § 161). 
209  JACK RALPH KLOPPENBURG, FIRST THE SEED: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PLANT 
BIOTECHNOLOGY, 1492-2000 5 (2005) (“Since 1935, yields of all major crops in the United States have at 
least doubled, and at least half of these gains are directly attributable to genetic improvements”). 
210  Given that the impetus of TRIPS was apparently through powerful industry voices, and no such 
powerful voices exist in the budding field of genetic research, negotiations for a new gene patent agreement 
are unlikely.  See Robert Weissman, A Long, Strange TRIPS: The Pharmaceutical Industry Drive to 
Harmonize Global Intellectual Property Rules, and the Remaining WTO Legal Alternatives Available to 
Third World Countries, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 1069 (1996).  However, this also means that nations 
could negotiate on the basis of governmental–rather than industry–needs.  See generally id. 
211  See Rebecca Eisenberg, How Can You Patent Genes? in WHO OWNS LIFE? 126 (Geertrui van 
Overwalle ed., 2009) (criticizing patent law as a method to encourage genetic research).  But see Arti K. 
Rai et al., Pathways Across the Valley of Death: Novel Intellectual Property Strategies for Accelerated 
Drug Discovery, in GENE PATENTS AND COLLABORATIVE LICENSING MODELS 247 (Geertrui van Overwalle 
ed., 2009) (describing contractual models for encouraging public-private sector IP agreements in the 
pharmaceutical industry).  See also supra note 53.  
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C. Funding the Regulatory Approval Process Through Public Investment 
Even if we assume that publicly funded genetic research can manage 
the substantial burden of being the only source of new genetic links, the 
regulatory process will still be a hurdle to get a genetic test to the market.212  
Like other diagnostic technology, consumers expect that an alleged gene-
disease link is reasonably certain.  This certainty may be established through 
a regulatory approval process, which would generally be funded by the 
company seeking to bring the product to market.213  Without intellectual 
property protections over genes, there would not necessarily be a market to 
encourage companies to invest in the regulatory process.  At the very least, it 
is appropriate to find a solution to pay for the regulatory hurdles of gene-
disease correlations. 
One possible way to do so is to use public funds to pay for the 
regulatory process.  If a government pays for a gene-disease clinical trial, 
then genetic testing services could freely provide genetic link information to 
physicians.  Moreover, for the sake of efficiency, it would be appropriate for 
different regulatory authorities from different nations to come together, share 
data, and test the gene-disease correlations in a cohesive international 
regulatory panel.  There is no reason why scientific conclusions cannot be 
accepted across borders.  
While this is the least invasive method of addressing the regulatory 
hurdle problem, it inherently suffers from losing commercial investments 
into genetic research.  Currently, in all areas of medical technology, 
commercial investment far surpasses public investment.214  The drawbacks 
of solutions A and B may not be so bad as to surpass the drawbacks of 
making commercial investment into research impossible.  In terms of the 
game theory model introduced in Section IV.D, the “A” terms would be less 
than those in a system which protected genes more thoroughly, however, the 
“C” term would be nearly eliminated. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The genetic research industry currently stands on a precipice.  
Cheaper genome sequencing technology will enable a new age of 
widespread genetic sequencing and personalized medicine.  Before this 
                                                      
212  See supra Part III.C. 
213  See supra Part III.C. 
214  See supra Part III.A. 
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occurs, governments should consider what sort of patent policy will allow 
genetic science to develop at the fastest rate, and the lowest cost. 
Patents are a proven method of accelerating research and development 
investment in the commercial world.  Patents are particularly important in 
highly regulated areas of technology like pharmaceuticals, due to time-
consuming and expensive regulatory trials.  It is likely that genetic tests will 
soon face similar regulations.  Thus, gene patents are a viable method of 
accelerating genetic research in the future. 
However, for a country that pays for the genetic tests of its citizens, it 
acutely feels the financial costs of each gene patent.  Despite the utilitarian 
benefits of gene patents, countries like Australia may believe that the costs 
outweigh the benefits.    
Because the costs related to a single developed country’s elimination 
of gene patents are felt by all countries, a more robust international 
agreement guaranteeing gene patents is necessary.  Such an agreement is 
possible through existing intellectual property regulating bodies such as the 
WTO. 
Developments in genetic sequencing technology create another 
dilemma.  Present gene patent regimes only protect isolated DNA, which are 
valuable in controlling inexpensive PCR tests–the standard gene testing 
process in industry.  However, when whole-genome sequencing becomes 
standard practice, the patents on primers that represent genes will be 
functionally useless.   
Proponents of gene patents should take action, if they hope to 
maintain the benefits of gene patents in the future.  They should promote 
change at an international level, to encourage individual countries from 
reaping the benefits of other patent systems, without accruing the costs.  
Commentators have suggested several possible international solutions to this 
problem.  Nations could agree to create a new intellectual property regime 
entirely, or make a special exception to the international patent system.  At 
the very least, an international organization should find a way to facilitate 
regulatory approval processes for genetic tests in individual nations.   
Regardless of your belief that gene patents represent a boon or burden 
to society, the gene patent debate will shift with impending developments in 
technology. 
 
 
